Many "good practices" in computer security are based on assumptions and local evidence that do not generalize. There are few quantifiable methods of establishing or refuting the validity of these practices from a user perspective. We propose a formal model of security policies that allows us to evaluate the claimed benefits to the user of the system quantitatively. We illustrate the use of the model by looking at a security policy we all live with daily: The Password Policy.
Introduction
There are many myths in the field of computer security that have a daily effect on the users of systems. Since there is little in the way of quantitative evaluation to support or disprove claims about improved security, assumptions are taken as fact, and we accept discomfort in return for supposed benefit. In most other parts of the security space, we have strong systems for reasoning about the strength of the system, but this has not been the case for user level policy. We know that many security vulnerabilities are due to users not complying with stated policy, due to a lack of understanding of the value of that policy. A mathematical model of the security system allows a firm underpinning for discourse with users on the motivation for the policy.
We use a password policy as an example since it illustrates the concept. To address questions about the efficacy of such policies, we develop a probabilistic model which captures the way these policies constrain how people choose passwords, and what this means for system security. Our primary aims with this model are twofold: 1) clarifying and formalising concepts used when discussing password policies and the level of security they engender (some concepts we clarify include password strength and the difficulty an attacker might have in subverting password security), and 2) exploring new applications of probabilistic modelling approaches already applied in other contexts, with the aim of gaining insight into security evaluation.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We begin in Section 2 with details of how we model a password-based security system that is both subject to password policies and open to attack from adversaries. Section 3 develops this further with a discussion of what password strength means in our model. In Section 4, user implications of our model are explored.
Modelling Password Choices and Attacker Actions
In a password-based security system, access to computing resources are controlled as follows: each user of the system has preassigned access rights to the resources -we refer to these access rights as a user-profile -and anyone can gain the access granted in a given user-profile by submitting the password for the userprofile to the system for authentication. In practice, the system may be viewed as a collection of software tools that: 1) maintain a database of the one-to-one correspondence between a user-profile and its related password, and 2) grant an entity access to a user profile if and only if the entity submits the password associated with the user-profile.
Naturally, there is a limited amount of computer memory available to the system for storing each password chosen by its users, where these passwords are comprised of symbols from a finite character set. Consequently, the set of all possible passwords, P, is finite and completely defined by the password security system.
A user of the password security system chooses a password, say π, from the typically large set P according to some probability distribution.
The system is open to attack by an attacker. Here, an attacker is any entity that seeks to subvert the password security system by correctly guessing the password for a legitimate user, submitting this guess to the password security system and, thereby, gaining access to those computer resources granted in a legitimate user-profile. An attack is the choice and submission of a password to the security system by an attacker. We refer to a collection of attacks by an attacker as an attack campaign. In conducting an attack campaign, the attacker chooses a sequence of passwords from P at random. Suppose the number of attacks (that is, the length of such a sequence) is N . Then the sequence of passwords, which we may refer to as σ, is an ordered N -tuple of passwords, say (π 1 , . . . , π N ). That is, an attack campaign is characterised by some sequence of passwords σ chosen by an attacker so that: σ = (π 1 , . . . , π N ) ∈ P × P × · · · × P N times , We accept the view that an identical amount of time and effort is expended by the attacker in carrying out each attack in an attack campaign. After all, attackers have no notion of how much closer they have gotten to correctly guessing a password after a succession of failed attacks, and the act of guessing and submitting a password to the system does not significantly change from attack to attack. Formally, therefore, if an attack campaign occurs over regular timeintervals in calendar time, then the length N of an attack campaign is a measure of the time and effort spent by the attacker. For the sake of brevity we shall write the cartesian product above, P × P × · · · × P, as P N .
An attack is deterministic in its outcome: a correctly guessed password by an attacker compromises the system, while an incorrect guess will not. Therefore, for each pair of user-password π and choice of password an attacker submits
